Internet use, in- and exclusion in decision-making processes within political parties by Thuermer, Gefion et al.
Internet use, in- and exclusion in decision-making 
processes within political parties
Gefion Thuermer1 Silke Roth1 Markus Luczak-Rösch2 Kieron O’Hara2 
1 Social Sciences   2 Electronics and Computer Science 
University of Southampton 
Southampton, UK 
{gefion.thuermer, silke.roth, m.luczak-rosch, K.M.O'Hara} @soton.ac.uk
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the effect of internet-use on democratic 
decision-making processes within political parties. Through two 
case studies of the Green Party and the Pirate Party Germany, the 
influence of internet-use on these processes and their inclusiveness 
are shown. We argue that how the internet is used in democratic 
processes impacts on participation and inclusion.  
How internet technology interacts with decision making processes 
within parties depends on the existing party structure and culture. 
Thus, in order to achieve meaningful and inclusive participation, 
the institutional framework and the influence it has must be 
considered in process and tool design. Whereas the affordances of 
specific online tools have been evaluated, the institutional context 
in which they are embedded have so far been widely ignored. We 
offer a structure for analysis of these foundations.  
CSS Concepts 
•Human-centered computing➝Empirical studies in HCI    
•Human-centered computing➝Empirical studies in collaborative 
and social computing 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Political parties are a fundamental building block of democratic 
societies. Citizens form parties to influence the policy-making 
process, which in turn ultimately shapes the laws that govern 
society. If – following Hyland [20] – democracy is understood as 
giving equal opportunities of participation to every citizen, then 
parties are one route through which this participation is enacted. 
This means that decisions within political parties should be made 
democratically as well. Parties have structured and documented 
decision-making processes, which include steps such as the 
development of ideas, proposition of motions or candidates, 
discussion and deliberation, and concluding votes. Some of these 
happen in a formal setting, governed by regulations, others are very 
informal; some of them take place on the internet, others offline. 
Due to the constant requirement for democratic decisions in 
politics, parties are an excellent organisational type to study 
democratic decision-making. According to Hyland, a decision-
making process ”must have a rule that determines the decision to 
be implemented as a function of the decisions made (…) by each 
participant" [20:41]. In consequence, decisions need to be made by 
all party-members, so that participation is indeed equal.  
Many studies have discussed how the internet is used in parties or 
in decision-making processes, and how political communication 
has changed through the internet. For example, Kerr and 
Waddington [23] described the implementation of online branches 
in a trade union, Jackson and Lilleker [22] investigated the effect 
social media has on political communication, and Gibson and 
Cantijoch [10] compared online and offline participation. However, 
to date there has been little research specifically on the role the 
internet plays and how it influences the decision-making processes 
in parties themselves.  
The two parties considered in this paper are the Green Party and 
Pirate Party Germany. Both parties were chosen due to their age, 
ideology, and advocacy for grassroots-democracy, all of which 
make them particularly suitable for this comparison. The Green 
Party was founded by environmental, peace, and women’s 
movements activists, just before the rise of the web in 1980. 
Although their ideals shifted during more than 30 years of political 
work, some of the grassroots-ideals still remain. The party wants to 
benefit from online technology, but also make sure that no-one who 
may not use the internet is left behind. The Pirate Party was founded 
as part of a global movement against the criminalisation of online 
culture in 2006, and strives for participation of all members. It 
developed quite literally through the internet, and publishes 
virtually all documents relevant for decisions online. The party 
believes that through new technology like the internet, democratic 
processes should change – and consequently uses a vast array of 
online tools through which members can participate.  
Both parties went through similar organisational developments, but 
at different times. Their decision-making processes are founded on 
grassroots and dense participation, but differ strongly in their 
implementation: The Green Party uses representation for most 
decisions beyond the local level, and has strict regulations for 
participation such as women’s quotas, whereas the Pirate Party 
allows participation for everyone in most processes, and direct 
voting for all members in all decisions relevant to their locale, but 
no representation at all. Both parties follow agendas on the left 
political spectrum, but are very different in their processes and use 
of technology, they offer a good comparison as organisations. 
Many comparisons have been drawn between them in the past [39], 
however none of these have looked at the parties’ decision-making 
processes, and the role of the internet in these processes. 
Different internet services (email, VoIP, web) are used within 
parties. Since we cannot discuss the implications of different 
protocols in this paper, and the distinction made in practice is 
between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ while the specific type of ‘online’ is 
of little meaning to the users, we will focus on the internet as a 
whole.  
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The internet, especially the web, offers the opportunity for 
everyone to easily contribute content and engage in discussions. 
This function is often perceived as a game changer, which 
influences how information is distributed and retrieved. We argue 
that this assessment passes over inequalities that arise through the 
technology. Both parties try to achieve similar goals, but they use 
different forms of participation, both on- and offline. The 
differences identified through the case studies, such as 
representative democracy versus direct participation, and  
‘collective or connective action’ [3], are linked to their ideological 
beliefs and institutional foundations. Insights gained through their 
comparison can help guide the design of future online participation 
platforms, and studies about these platforms, but also have wider 
implications for studies of innovative democratic concepts. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Hyland describes democracy as the form of political rule where “all 
those significantly affected by the decisions have equal and 
effective rights of participation at all levels of decision-making” 
[20:2]. In practice, this requires consideration of the ‘who’ and 
‘how’ of decision-making. Party membership is defined through 
laws and statutes, which creates a bounded group for the former, 
whereas the latter will be investigated through the remainder of this 
paper.  The rules around decision-making in political parties more 
and more often involve online elements. The effect of these 
elements on the democracy of the decisions will be discussed in the 
following. 
2.1 Democratic Decisions 
Group decision-making can be conducted in various ways, all of 
which share advantages, such as 
“More knowledge and expertise is available to 
solve the problem; a greater number of 
alternatives are examined; the final decision is 
better understood and accepted by all group 
members; and there is more commitment 
among all group members to make the final 
decision work.” [27, in 35] 
However, group decision-making is also prone to some 
disadvantages, including social pressure (for individuals to decide 
in a certain way), elite domination (of powerful individuals over the 
group), and time delays (the larger the group the more time is 
required for all to have their say and agree). Organisations find 
different ways to use the advantages and work around the 
disadvantages, and political parties specifically try to overcome 
some of these challenges through the use of online technology. 
Where organisations used to organise hierarchically, they can now 
be observed to apply network structures instead. In the context of 
social movements, Bennett and Segerberg [3] describe this as the 
difference between the logic of collective and connective action. 
They observe the emergence of connective action, which is 
supported by, but not solely achieved through, internet technology. 
Connective action networks consist of individuals who share goals, 
and function with little to no coordination, through information 
exchange and the sharing of online content. Participation is the core 
of the network, not a means to an end, and formal organisations are 
neither required, nor necessary. In organisations of collective 
action, activity is structured centrally. The base problem is to 
recruit people who contribute to a common cause, for which well 
organised and funded organisations are required.  
We suggest that the logics of collective and connective action could 
be applied to parties, or their members, and to the way in which 
parties organise: On the one hand they are required to have a formal 
structure, which is very much on the collective action side of the 
spectrum, while they may also want participation at the centre of 
their political work, and thus encourage their members to act as 
connective action networks. This is likely more so if parties stress 
bottom-up members’ participation over top-down decisions.  
Democratic decisions require equality and participation of all 
affected, either directly or through representatives. Inequalities 
occur when specific groups or minorities are not represented in, or 
systematically excluded from, the decision-making process. This 
can happen through personal, social and economic circumstances 
of participants, or the practical implementation of processes. They 
can also be inherent in organisational processes. One example for 
this is the systematic discrimination of women through supposedly 
gender-neutral standards organisations have developed based on 
men, through underlying assumptions that are hardly questioned, as 
described by Acker [1]. Moreover, voting  behaviour correlates 
with education and income, and reflects gender-segregated labour 
markets [25]. Parties who want to make democratic decisions need 
to be aware of these issues in order to address and mitigate them. 
Processes achieve equal participation in different ways. Voting, the 
typical decision-making process in democracies, merely requires 
standing opinions that can be voiced and counted [41]. A vote may 
be preceded by discussion, which helps individuals to form an 
opinion based on which they then cast their vote. Consensus is 
neither achieved, nor is it necessary. In theory, equal participation 
is given so long as everyone has a vote. Whether this is truly the 
case in practice depends on the actual implementation of the 
process by which binding decisions are made.  
In deliberative processes, participants exchange opinions and find 
consensus in open discourse. Deliberation requires the exchange of 
arguments and opinions, and scrutiny of different points of views. 
Genuine openness to changes of opinion is paramount, since the 
goal is to agree on a consensus acceptable to all, and not to convince 
another party of a specific point of view.  
In both consensus and deliberative decision-making, the basis for 
equality is the equal opportunity to be heard.  This was found to be 
problematic in the Occupy movement [36], which used consensus 
decision-making at their assemblies. Despite the goal of promoting 
equality, the process in practice leads to exclusion: the only way for 
members to participate in decisions is to attend assemblies. Time 
and location of these assemblies put members who have other 
commitments at a disadvantage. Among those who do attend 
assemblies, the less experienced members can be discouraged from 
active participation. Moreover, participating in decision-making as 
well as in working groups is complicated, as schedules of 
assemblies and group-work overlap. Thus members have to choose 
whether they want to actively work for the movement in these 
groups, or  attend assemblies to participate in its decision-making 
[36].  This has been recognized by Occupy and other actors who 
engage in consensus-decision making, and the ‘progressive stack’ 
(in which members of underrepresented groups (women, ethnic 
minorities) are prioritised in speakers’ lists) are employed to assure 
that these groups are included [34]. 
Such social movements often claim to be leader-full rather than 
leader-less, because many members are involved in decision 
making processes [8]. It is assumed that this prevents a rule through 
elites and improve equal participation. This is not necessarily the 
case however, because instead of staying ‘structureless’, informal 
structures can evolve. This can in turn lead to informal elites who 
influence decisions, but have no obligation to act in the interest of 
the group. Without formal structures, these informal elites cannot 
be held accountable [38]. Furthermore, the absence of 
representatives that can speak for the organisation and lead 
discussions can be a disadvantage in organisation applying 
consensus decision-making. 
2.2 Use of Technology 
Both voting and deliberation are supposedly simplified through the 
internet. However, participating online requires technical capital, 
which is not equally distributed, because it is linked to similarly 
unequally distributed social and economic capital. Already 
disadvantaged groups do not have large amounts of these forms of 
capital, so they stay disadvantaged when they go online [43].  The 
internet, though it may increase power for example for global media 
corporations or talented ‘geeks’, also reproduces existing 
inequalities for the illiterate, the poor, and otherwise disadvantaged 
groups.[15]  
Provision of hardware, internet access and training can help, but not 
solve the problem of unequal usage on their own, because users can 
only apply skills usefully in a context that they are familiar with. 
Therefore, the use of internet and communication technology (ICT) 
needs to be grounded in and formed through everyday practice [14].  
Internet use can increase political participation, as Ward et al. have 
found in the UK Liberal Democrats, albeit only if a base interest 
already exists [40]. 
In addition to differences in access, those who do have access to the 
internet also derive unequal benefits from its use [16, 18]. Each 
group, online or offline, uses it in their own particular context: 
“different social institutions have different objectives, concerns and 
modus operandi, and hence impose different requirements on their 
IT infrastructure” [7:1]. Not only in Germany, the internet is 
primarily used by young, male and well-educated individuals, who 
are thus over-represented in online decision-making processes [26]. 
Gibson and Cantijoch found that most of the political participation 
that happens online are offline activities that have been transferred 
online, such as reading news [10]. 
In 1987, Held described how citizens should have more influence 
on issues that concern them locally, in a form of participatory 
democracy. ICT was seen to play a key role in this participation, 
especially for disadvantaged groups [19]. It would be an 
opportunity as well as a threat, and “could lead either to popular 
sovereignty or to populist manipulation”[29:56], depending on who 
uses it more effectively.  
If online participation is to fulfil the democratic requirement of 
equal participation, all participants must be able to fully participate 
in decision-making processes. They need access to, and skills in the 
use of, the technology. If party members do not have access to all 
of these, online processes can create inequality.  
2.2.1 The internet in organisations 
Access is not only required for members to the internet, but also the 
other way around: the organisation must be able to reach all their 
members online, if online processes are to be inclusive. A study of 
the introduction of virtual branches in UNISON showed that a 
transition to online processes is surprisingly complicated [23]. 
Although nowadays an email address is typically collected along 
with address information, the union was founded before the 
internet, and thus did not have this data for all their members. The 
virtual branches increased participation, especially for members 
that had already been active offline, who then adopted the 
additional online service. Participation increased gradually beyond 
this group, especially for women, possibly pointing to increased use 
in the long term. However, the higher the diversity of members was, 
the higher was the workload required to maintain the virtual 
branches, and the workforce that had previously handled the offline 
processes was insufficient for the same task online. 
Online participation is possible, but it does not come for free, and 
not on its own. Institutional processes are generally stable, they do 
not change through new technologies by themselves. They may 
change when new technology becomes available, but only through 
the integration of new tools into existing processes, which can 
either happen consciously intended, or unanticipated [2]. As 
Gibson et al pointed out: “Context matters”, and the use 
organisations can make of internet technology will be limited by 
their size, age and function [11].  
Discourse on online platforms also causes other concerns: Online 
platforms tend to be homogenous, as individuals with similar 
opinions find each other in groups where they mutually reinforce 
existing opinions rather than challenging them [41]. Online forums 
primarily facilitate monologues and self-expression, instead of 
dialogue and exchange of ideas [42]. Similarities with tendencies 
of social network platforms are evident: homogeneity on Facebook 
groups, and reinforcement of existing opinions not only through 
social selection of friends, but also through algorithms of the 
platform itself [5]. Networks that exist offline are replicated online, 
and individuals who participate online were typically already active 
offline, so no new audience is reached simply by going online [33]. 
Rather than opening the political sphere up to new groups, people 
who are already politically involved use the internet to improve on 
that work. Platform design determines what can be achieved, and is 
therefore a policy decision in itself [13, in 41]. Especially in parties, 
where members would be expected to have similar views already, 
all of this may be the case – and should be, according to David 
Weinberger [21], who argues that a ‘base agreement’ is necessary 
for conversations. Similarly, O’Hara and Stevens [32] point out that 
these ‘echo chambers’ are neither necessarily harmful, nor unique 
to the internet. 
2.2.2 Online decision-making 
Decision-making by anonymous citizens may lead to morally 
inacceptable decisions, because this group would not be 
accountable to anyone. The simple aggregation of opinions cannot 
replace the checks and balances of a representative democracy 
system, because parties as intermediaries are important. They “do 
not simply transmit information; they actively process it, especially 
by synthesizing political opinions and interests into ideologically 
coherent platforms” [2:312]. Replacing representative democracy 
with direct democracy through online platforms would neglect this 
role of parties and thereby weaken the democratic process.  
The main barriers for direct participation are time and space 
limitations for face-to-face meetings, lack of (perceived) expertise, 
and time limitations to fill knowledge gaps and vote on all 
decisions.  Millers ‘program for direct and proxy voting in the 
legislative process’ is an attempt to overcome all three of these 
barriers. As a hypothetic prototype for Liquid Democracy systems, 
it suggests to “allow citizens to vote directly or delegate proxy to 
someone else” [28:108, italics in original]. What Miller imagined 
to be modern computer technology in 1969 would allow to tally 
votes from delegates as well as individual voters on any matter. 
Conceptually, Liquid Democracy allows the ‘fluid’ delegation of 
votes to ‘proxies’, who then vote on behalf of the constituent for 
specified areas or decisions. But it is prone to the same criticism as 
direct decisions: Although delegates may be held accountable by 
their constituents, participants who vote directly rather than 
delegating are not accountable to anyone. Instead of coherently 
grouped opinions, and the potential to negotiate consensus between 
groups, without representative elements, decisions would be made 
purely based on majorities and may thus lead to unethical results 
[9]. 
One attempt to implement Liquid Democracy is the software 
Liquid Feedback (LQFB), an online-voting tool that is popular 
within the Pirate Party movement. It allows to support motions, 
make alteration suggestions, and propose alternatives. Users can 
either vote on issues themselves, or delegate their vote for an issue, 
area, or the entire platform to another user.  LQFB has been 
analysed in many contexts, however most research focuses on the 
software alone, without considering its wider position as part of a 
decision-making process [6, 24]. 
The biggest technical problem in Liquid Democracy systems is the 
requirement to allow secret votes, while at the same time giving 
users who delegate to others the possibility to hold their delegates 
to account, which requires their votes to be non-secret. Google 
Votes might be a solution for this problem. It was developed on the 
internal part of the Google+ social network, and lead to a ‘Golden 
Rule of Liquid Democracy’: “If I give you my vote, I can see what 
you do with it”[17:4]. This is based on the requirement that 
delegations must be explicitly accepted, which is not the case in 
LQFB. 
Another option for deliberative online decision-making is the 
platform ‘Deliberatorium’, which uses argument mapping to 
structure discussion within groups. This allows more efficient 
deliberation at a larger scale opposed to what is possible in online 
forums [37]. The platform proved less time consuming for 
organisation as well as participants, since structure, filtering and 
elimination of redundancy – typical forum drawbacks – were done 
throughout the process. This improved the discussion and its result, 
and also improved the experience for users. Deliberation tools may 
well be the next step towards scalable online decision-making, 
although their scale is still limited. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The case studies comprise the analysis of statutes and regulations, 
and in-depth interviews with members of both parties. The formal 
rules that govern both processes were drawn from the documents 
and formed the basis of the interview guide.  
3.1 Sampling 
The selection of interview partners was informed by the party 
structure. Selection criteria were be based on ‘hot spots’ in the party 
and process framework, such as members that were involved in 
committees or held positions which oversee processes. All 
interview partners have overseen, managed, participated, or 
otherwise been involved in the decision-making processes. Where 
possible, participants were approached through existing personal 
contacts. In addition, the party head offices were contacted to 
identify and reach out to suitable individuals.  
Three interviews were conducted with actors from the Green Party, 
five interviews with actors from the Pirate Party. The number of 
interviews was limited by time constraints for the completion of the 
study, as well as by access to the relevant individuals. The latter is 
especially true for the Green Party, where fewer personal contacts 
existed. Despite the smaller number of interviews, the data gathered 
from the key stakeholders is sufficient to analyse the processes. 
3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Qualitative interviews were considered the most appropriate 
approach to gain insight into the formal and informal elements of 
the decision-making processes, since only involved party members 
would know the latter, and the study required depth which could 
not have been gained through other means. All interviews were 
conducted via Skype, and lasted between one and two hours.  
The interviews covered all aspects of the formal process. Open 
questions allowed to focus on areas that were important for the 
interviewees, or where they had specialist knowledge. Interview 
questions revolved around the decision-making processes for 
policy decisions and board elections. Participants were asked to 
describe what typically happens within and beyond the framework 
set by laws and statues, the role of the internet in the process, and 
its perceived strengths and weaknesses. The aim was to find out 
how the rules were applied and possibly modified in real-life 
situations, which additional elements of the process exist, what role 
the internet plays, and which inequalities are addressed. All 
participants were interviewed in German, and quotes in the 
following have been translated into English. 
3.3 Positionality 
The first author of this paper was a member of the Pirate Party for 
several years, amongst other activities also filling roles in the 
executive board. Through the active work in the party, the author 
already had extensive insight into the party processes, which played 
a role in the specific design of the study. Familiarity with several 
individuals made access into the Pirate Party easier – a benefit that 
did not exist to the same extend in the Green Party. Existence of 
this personal network was not perceived as having a negative 
influence on the interviews themselves, in either party. The 
familiarity with one parties’ processes is why in-depth interviews 
were considered to be the best approach to this study. Not only did 
they allow to gain similar insight in both parties, but also gave us a 
foundation to base the analysis on others’ rather than our own 
experience.  
3.4 Analysis 
All interviews were coded for six criteria: 
1. Actions (What happens?) 
2. Places (Where does it happen?) 
3. Processes (How does it happen?) 
4. Use of the internet (How is it used?) 
5. Factors of consideration (Why does it happen this way?)  
6. Inequalities (What is inclusive / exclusive?) 
Since responses were based on the experience of interviewees at 
multiple positions within the process, codes 1-4 were mainly used 
to guide the development of a clearer picture of the entire process. 
Codes 5 and 6 were used to identify underlying themes. 
Through the comparison of the decision-making processes of both 
parties, the following questions were to be answered: 
• How does the use of the internet in decision-making processes 
differ between the parties? 
• What effects do the different processes have regarding 
inclusion / exclusion? 
4. RESULTS 
Both parties see different forms of inequalities, and address them 
through different means, while claiming to exercise grass-roots 
democracy. The Green Party is very conscious of inequalities, and 
attempts to either reduce or at least not increase them. The Pirate 
Party aims to achieve equality by creating a uniform starting 
position for all members. While the Pirate Party intends to give as 
many members as possible the opportunity to be directly involved, 
through a variety of online tools, the Green Party tries to give every 
member an equal opportunity to participate, and thus limits the 
participation opportunities to the lowest common denominator 
among all members, which involves far less online technology and 
more traditional participation techniques. 
4.1 Democratic Decisions 
4.1.1 Participation 
In the Green Party, the online distribution of motions is seen as one 
of the main administrative advantages. The party specifically 
created a tool, known as the Antragstool (motion tool) which serves 
as a platform for motion access and submission. It was initially 
created for work on policies, and includes a discussion process, 
through which motions could be collaboratively created. However 
the discussion function is deliberately not used, because it is 
considered impractical.  Through this tool the decision-making 
processes became more transparent as now all members can access 
all motions for assemblies, and see what happens to the motions 
they submitted, both of which was previously impossible. This only 
benefits members who use the internet, but is still an improvement 
to what would have been possible before, when members could 
only access motions through paper files in their local branch office. 
However, according to the federal office, the number of motions 
that are proposed for each conference did not change since they are 
published and submitted online. Although the online tools have not 
achieved equality in this case, they reduced inequality and 
intensified, if not increased opportunities for participation.  
In the Pirate Party, motions are developed, submitted, and 
discussed primarily online, through party owned or mediated 
platforms such as etherpads for collaborative writing, Mumble (a 
VoIP software) for voice conferences, email and mailing lists for 
group communication, a wiki to publish and archive information, 
survey tools for polls, and Liquid Feedback to refine motions. The 
party is not formally involved in the development or discussion of 
the motions, it just provides tools that everyone can use, and 
members – including board members in their ‘rank-and-file 
member’ role – organise themselves decentrally. Members can 
submit motions offline if they wish, but there is no offline way 
available to access them, let alone an offline way to find out how 
they could do this. All processes are so entirely internet-based, that 
pure offline participation may well be impossible.  
4.1.2 Representation 
In the Green Party, all members are represented in national 
decisions through their local representative. These are elected at 
regional assemblies, which gives the regions weight both in regards 
to party conferences and as a platform for discussion of motions. 
The local branch is the way for members to be represented and hold 
their representatives to account. Because delegates attend 
assemblies as official representatives, their travel costs are 
reimbursed. 
The Pirate Party does not use a representation system for their 
assemblies because this would be considered incompatible with the 
ideal of grassroots democracy. Instead, all members can attend 
general assemblies and vote upon all issues themselves. Whether 
members do attend depends on their available time and money for 
travel, as the party does not reimburse these costs for attending 
rank-and-file members. The potential exclusion through travel and 
accommodation costs is frequently discussed, and while attempts 
are made to address it, for example through low-cost transport 
solutions or reduced rates at local hotels or campsites, a party-
mediated solution does not exist. If members cannot attend, they 
cannot participate.  
Whether delegations, especially chain delegations (members 
delegating to members who delegate to other members) in online 
systems such as LQFB are acceptable, has been a tremendous 
discussion within the Pirate Party which has not yet been finally 
concluded.  The party uses the internet to communicate across 
federal states; regional branches are therefore hardly relevant for 
decisions at the national level.  
4.1.3 Time 
The Green Party interviewees perceived significant differences 
between full-time politicians and volunteer members, mostly due 
to a difference in resources and time: full-time politicians can have 
their staff brief them on important motions. This resource is not 
available to volunteer members, who would have to go through all 
motions on their own, which is impossible due to their number (for 
the last assembly roughly 2,600), as a member of staff pointed out: 
“About 60% of the participants of delegate 
assemblies are volunteer members. They don’t 
sit in front of their computer every week to look 
at the preparations of the conference. They 
have a normal job, family, and might look at 
motions two weeks before.”  
This problem can only be partially solved. It is addressed through 
a discussion organised by the motion committee in advance of 
conferences, which aims to reduce the number of motions that is to 
be voted on. However, this in turn leads to lack of clarity, as change 
motions often overlap, which makes it complicated for members to 
stay aware of what they are deciding about, as a member of the 
party leadership ´described:  
“Many change motions relate to a single line. 
If you accept the first motion, the line changes. 
But then there’s another motion that changes 
the same line, and makes a completely different 
change. So you try to combine them somehow. 
(…) And then we have this 1600 times. This is 
really complicated to process, so that it is still 
transparent and democratic. (…) When people 
are not informed and vote on motions without 
really knowing what it is they are deciding 
about, because they cannot retrace it, it is 
doubtful whether this is still in accord with our 
democratic ideals.” 
This problem also exists in the Pirate Party, but since the party has 
full-time politicians only in four state parliaments, the difference to 
members is less problematic at the national level. The party can also 
only decide about a limited number of all submitted motions at each 
assembly (19% of submitted motions were discussed at the most 
recent one). Rather than limiting their number, the party has 
developed an online process to rank the motions in advance of the 
assembly, by which means it then determines the assemblies’ 
agenda. However the agenda can be changed through a vote by the 
assembly, which makes the motions that are going to be discussed 
unpredictable. This means that attendees would still need to prepare 
for all motions to be discussed. Whereas in the Green Party only 
the delegates need to prepare for the assembly, in the Pirate Party 
this applies to all members who wish to participate, which likely 
takes more factual time from other tasks. However, the assembly 
attendees have found ways to work around this, such as factual peer 
delegations: Often a handful of members will act as opinion leaders 
whose example other members follow during open votes. 
4.1.4 Gender 
For the Green Party, with roots in the women’s movement, 
inequalities based on gender are seen and addressed throughout the 
decision-making process. This is achieved mainly through gender-
based speakers’ lists, who are called in turns, and a 50% quota 
system for women across all elections. These gender-balancing 
practices are engrained and all interviewees seemed to see them as 
self-evident. 
In the Pirate Party, gender is not addressed at all. Interviewees 
spoke about the fairness of the process, for example a member of 
the PR team stated: 
“The advantages of grass-roots democracy 
cannot be valued high enough (…) One is not 
just a paying member, but truly participates.” 
None of the five (and all male) interviewees even mentioned gender 
differences. At general assemblies, discussions are structured by 
opinion rather than gender: speakers are called alternately based on 
whether they want to argue for or against a motion. The Pirate Party 
does not collect data on gender but an independent study estimates 
that approximately 8.5% of the membership in 2011 identified as 
women [30]. Their lack of women in elected positions is striking, 
compared to the 50% quote of the Green Party. The Pirate Party 
Berlin just elected 32 candidates including 7 women for the next 
election [4]; the executive board has nine members including two 
women [31]. By way of comparison, the Green Party currently has 
the highest proportion of women in the larger German parties with 
38.5% [31]. A women’s quota has been discussed and refused by a 
Pirate Party assembly. There is no perception that women would 
have different or additional requirement for equal participation. 
Because women have the same opportunities in the process as men, 
their requirement for participation is perceived as satisfied.  
4.2 Use of technology 
4.2.1 Formality 
In the Green Party technology and the internet are formal parts of 
processes and included in party regulations, such as the requirement 
for motions to be published online. The internet is used to amplify 
administrative processes, save costs, and increase participation. 
Everything happens offline by default. If anything is done online, 
it is a conscious decision, aiming to make processes faster and 
cheaper, and content more accessible for better participation.  
Although technology and the internet are used extensively by the 
Pirate Party, their use is far less formalised. The internet is hardly 
even mentioned in the regulations. Purely based on party 
regulations, every process could be performed offline. This is not 
the case in practice however, as the internet is what makes these 
process and their scale possible in the first place. It is natural for 
the party to do everything online. A few exceptions are deliberately 
kept offline, such as assemblies for decisions, or elections being 
held on paper rather than digital.  
The tools that are used for formal processes, such as the wiki to 
submit motions, are used only by custom: they are not even 
mentioned in the statutes or procedural rules. In board elections, 
candidates apply online, are introduced and questioned online. The 
party allows every member to stand for these elections, typically 
leading to a large number of candidates. The online preparation is 
therefore necessary, because otherwise every candidate would need 
to have extensive introduction time at the assembly, which would 
demand too much time. Overall, the use of offline techniques seems 
to be largely due to legal requirements (such as time for candidates 
to introduce themselves) or insufficiencies in technology (such as 
secure online voting systems). 
4.2.2 Online access 
Internet access of members is the main concern for the Green Party, 
as visible in the non-use of online discussions: It would be 
impossible to keep all members – including those that still want 
(and have a right to receive) all documents on paper – informed 
about the latest status of the motions, let alone the discussion. If not 
all members would be able to participate, in a process that is 
governed by the party, the party would generate inequality. The 
process would be very easy to do online, but cannot be made 
compatible to the offline world. To treat all members equally, 
online processes are not used at all – the smallest common 
denominator are the well-worn offline processes. As a member of 
the party leadership stated:  
“We need to transpose decision procedures to 
the web, and to understand who participates. 
What if it is only 1% of the member base, and 
so on? (…) Who would be excluded from this 
process? What about people who do not have a 
computer? It may not be many, but they do have 
different requirements.” 
The Pirate Party considers all online processes to be accessible, and 
deliberately offers a variety of online platforms for participation. 
All of these enable the members to communicate and collaborate, 
draw up new motions, propose them, announce applications for 
elections, and campaign amongst the membership. As stated by a 
member of the team that organises general assemblies: 
“The claim that there are members of the Pirate 
Party who are excluded from participation 
because they do not have internet access or a 
computer is coming up frequently. (…) despite 
searching for them, I have never seen this 
‘Offline-Pirate’.” 
The most striking difference between the parties’ use of the internet 
are their reasons for this use: it is participation and equality for both 
of them. But while the Pirate Party uses the internet to achieve 
participation and equality, the Green Party does not use it for the 
same reason. While the Green Party avoids the use of online 
discussion platforms, as it would exclude members who do not have 
access to the internet, the Pirate Party employs them so that 
everyone can participate. This is based on a difference in 
fundamental assumptions of both parties. Where the Green Party 
assumes that not all members have access to the internet, the Pirate 
Party assumes that all their members do. However, the differences 
between the two parties are actually relatively small, 82% of the 
Green Party members and 92% of the Pirate Party members can be 
reached via email according to data provided by party 
administration.  
This means that 8% of the members of the Pirate Party cannot be 
contacted by email. This does not mean that these members do not 
participate at all. Invitations to assemblies are sent by post for those 
members that cannot be reached online, and access to most systems 
does not require validation through the party, let alone membership. 
But the party cannot involve these 8% of their members in the two 
online process elements that are party-governed: official polls and 
access to Liquid Feedback. 
 
4.2.3 Communication and Consensus 
The Green Parties’ own online social network Wurzelwerk is used 
in different ways across the federal branches but not for discussions 
about the party conference. Discussions instead happen informally 
on privately owned sites such as Facebook, and on a face-to-face 
consensus-meeting the night before party conferences. 
The Pirate Party does not support any formal face-to-face (or 
indeed any formal) meetings for consensus-finding. These are 
instead arranged by members themselves, through infrastructure 
provided by the party. Instead of proposing alternative motions, 
they are refined before they are submitted, and made capable of 
consensus through Liquid Feedback, where controversial elements 
can be spotted and resolved. However this can create consensus 
only among participating members on that platform – there is no 
data to confirm the overlap between the participants of Liquid 
Feedback and general assemblies.  
Both parties’ members use online social networks to discuss 
candidates and motions, but these discussions happen only through 
informal groups of members.  Interviewees from the Pirate Party 
speak about online-tools as ‘natural, taken for granted, totally 
normal’. Often the variety of tools that is used is so natural that they 
hardly even consider it as something extraordinary. Interviewees 
from the Green Party however show that same ‘natural’-approach 
to offline methods. This may partly be dependent on the age of the 
members that were interviewed, and the age difference may well 
influence the parties’ behaviour more generally. The average of a 
Green Party member is 48 years, compared to 38 years in the Pirate 
Party.   
4.2.4 Binding Online Decisions 
According to interviewees from the Green Party, online voting 
tools have so far been prevented by the expected costs. In the short 
term, holding assemblies is considered cheaper and easier to 
organise than to build, implement and maintain an online system. 
As a delegate explained:  
“In the short term it costs less money to rent a 
room and arrange a face to face meeting, than 
to do it online, and setup the entire 
infrastructure.” 
In addition, all the arguments against online discussions are even 
more important for binding decisions. Nevertheless, according to a 
member of the party leadership, the party currently investigates if 
and how an online system for binding decisions could be 
implemented, and how exclusion through such a system could be 
prevented. 
Despite many years of discussion, and the variety of tools that could 
potentially support such a step, the Pirate Party also cannot make 
legally binding online decisions. Liquid Feedback, although often 
described in the literature as a decision-making platform, does not 
have the statutory role that would be required to make binding 
decisions. It is used in the process, to develop policy and prepare 
motions, but not to vote on them. The one statutory option to make 
online decisions is the Basisentscheid (base decision). A member 
of the working group for the implementation of this solution 
described that, apart from internal legal complications, it has not 
been implemented due to conflicts within the party: software was 
developed for the purpose, but developers and executive board 




In the following we will argue that in terms of democratic decisions 
(1) both parties provide different opportunities for 
participation; 
(2) participation in the Pirate Party is exclusive both online 
and offline; 
(3) online and offline forms of participation can be mutually 
supportive; 
(4) decisions in the Green Party are more likely to be 
accepted by the membership; 
(5) the Green Party seems to follows collective action, the 
Pirate Party connective action principles; 
(6) the lack of structure in the Pirate Party has led to 
unofficial leadership roles; 
(7) gender differences in the Pirate Party persist 
systemically. 
In regards to the use of technology,  
(8) different participation profiles for different 
demographics are highly likely in the Pirate Party; 
(9) online processes may have made participation easier in 
the Green Party, but not necessarily increased 
participation; 
(10) an increase in participation by less technology-savvy 
members can be expected over time; 
(11) the Pirate Party established online processes that fill 
equivalent roles to offline processes in the Green Party; 
(12) The echo chamber effect online may lead to 
destabilisation; 
(13) Liquid Democracy as a concept may be incompatible 
with democratic processes within political parties; 
5.1 Democratic Decisions  
(1) Neither of the parties uses a formal, purely deliberative 
decision-making process, but both of them use formal or informal 
deliberative elements. In the Green Party this is best visible in the 
consensus-meeting ahead of conferences, where motions are 
combined so that consensus can be achieved among delegates. The 
party offers opportunities for participation in their preparation of 
decisions, as every member can propose motions, but also through 
the delegate assemblies, where every member has a representative 
through which they are counted, even if absent [41]. In the Pirate 
Party, deliberation happens in a formal way only at general 
assemblies, through their structured discussion of motions, and is 
organised informally by members ahead of it. 
The structure of the Green Party is very much geared towards 
democratic participation, with members being represented 
throughout decisions at all levels, apart from the local 
representative election, and additional direct input into the process 
in form of motion proposals and deliberation. The Pirate Party 
process on the other hand is geared towards direct participation, to 
the extent that members can directly participate at every stage of 
the process, but can do this only directly.  
(2) Regardless of how participatory the online processes in the 
Pirate Party are, they are not inclusive, because they do not consider 
any differences in access or skills between members. The forum for 
actual binding decisions in form of offline general assemblies is 
equally exclusive, as it does not consider differences in mobility 
and funds between members. Comparable to what Smith and 
Gidden [36] found for assemblies in the Occupy movement, only 
those members who can attend the assembly, anywhere in the 
country, for an entire weekend, can speak and vote. Other than 
some social movements, the Pirate Party has not developed 
techniques such as the progressive stack [34], which could mitigate 
this situation by advancing the chances to be heard for the attending 
members of minorities. 
(3) Different from Smith and Giddens findings for Occupy, 
developing motions and voting on them are probably not mutually 
exclusive, as general assemblies are planned far in advance and 
happen only once or twice per year. Decision preparation happens 
purely online, and consensus finding online is very much limited to 
Liquid Feedback – a tool that does not allow the exchange of 
arguments. The process engages the members that use the internet 
for motion proposition, and those who physically attend assemblies 
to vote upon them. Similar to what Gil de Zúñiga et al. [12] found 
for political bloggers, online and offline participation may be 
mutually supportive: The introduction and defence of motions at 
the assembly plays a vital role in the process. Members who 
propose motions, but cannot attend the assembly to introduce and 
defend them, may face a lower probability of their motions being 
accepted.  
(4) In regards to Lunenburg’s [27] advantages of group decision 
making, it can be argued that the decision-making process of the 
Green Party is likely to achieve a higher acceptance as well as more 
commitment from their members. The representation system may 
not lead to factual involvement of all members in decisions, but at 
least members can feel they are part of the decision through their 
representatives. While the Pirate Party involves members at every 
stage, this does not mean that every member is involved in every 
decision. Instead, members pick the working groups and motions 
they want to work on. When they do not attend the assembly, they 
do not actually participate in decisions, which may lead to 
frustration and reduced acceptance of decisions that are made in 
their absence.  
(5) Considering the logic of collective and connective action by 
Bennett and Segerberg [3], it can be said that the parties, or rather 
their members, lean toward different principles. Both parties have 
a formal organisational structure, which is required of political 
parties by German law. Within that structure however, the Green 
Party has embraced institutions like representation and party wings, 
and although it encourages participation by individual members, 
the formal structure of branches and representatives takes priority. 
For the Pirate Party it is the other way around: although the formal 
organisation exists, the members refused further formalisation of 
structures such as party wings or representatives, and the 
interactions in the network of participating members is what carries 
the decision-making process. 
(6) This is closely linked to the ‘structurelessness’ of the Pirate 
Party. The executive board does not have a special role in decision-
making processes, and the guideline motions proposed by the 
Green Parties’ board do not exist.1 Since there is no official 
leadership role in program development, unofficial leadership roles 
have emerged, as was expected following Freeman[38]. This 
behaviour is visible for example in the way members vote with their 
peers at the assembly. Despite clearly existing opinion leaders, 
these members do not have representative roles that would allow 
them to be held accountable or represent groups of members in 
deliberations between groups of opposing opinions. 
(7) Regarding gender differences, the parties could hardly be more 
different. The Green Party focuses on equal participation for and 
                                                                
1 At the last assembly, the executive board of the Pirate Party did propose a motion comparable to the Green Parties’ guideline motions, 
which was accepted by the assembly. Since this happened after our data collection, we cannot include this new development in our analysis. 
representation of women in their policies as well as their actions, 
whereas the Pirate Party assumes that a uniform starting position 
for all members is sufficient to achieve equal participation for all 
members regardless of their gender. In combination with the lack 
of demographic data about their members, this is little surprising – 
they neither know who their members are, nor who participates, and 
therefore cannot know how representative the participants are of 
the member base. The available data about the gender of members 
suggest that the vast majority of members are male, which in turn 
allows the assumption that the assumed equal participation may 
well be gendered assumptions [1]: The vast majority of male 
members defines and accepts the standards for participation as fair, 
therefore female members can be marginalised because they have 
no say in the setting of these standards, even if they disagree with 
them. Thus the problem is systemic and can hardly be addressed 
from within the existing processes. 
5.2 Use of Technology 
(8) The Green Party clearly acknowledges that online processes 
would exclude those members that do not use ICT, and that some 
members – especially those with staff at their disposal – derive 
greater benefits from online participation. Following Halford and 
Savage [16], knowledge about inequalities is required to mediate 
them. Since the Pirate Party does not consider these factors at all in 
their process design or decisions about technology they use, these 
inequalities are allowed to fester. Thus different participation 
profiles for different demographics, such as lower participation by 
single parents, older people, ethnic minorities or women, are highly 
likely. 
(9) The fact that in the Green Party the number of motions did not 
change since the online process was introduced allows the 
assumption that the non-online members who wanted to propose 
motions have found ways to do this through other means. Thus the 
internet may have made the process easier for members who 
already participated, but did not necessarily lead to an increase in 
participation, in neither depth nor breadth.  
(10) This strongly reminds of Kerr and Waddington [23]’s study of 
UNISON. Online participation in the Green Party might also start 
out with limited uptake in the beginning followed by a steady rise 
of participation by previously underrepresented groups. Then, a rise 
in participation of less online-proficient members in the Green 
Party can be expected.  
(11) As predicted by Agre [2], the Green Party uses the web to 
amplify existing processes, some of which happens intentional, 
such as the introduction of the motion tool, and some is unintended, 
such as the use of Social Media to discuss motions. The Pirate Party 
on the other hand had no processes it could have amplified in the 
first place, and therefore developed entirely new processes, such as 
the refinement of motions through Liquid Feedback. It could be 
argued that the party found technological solutions for problems 
that may have arisen through their extended use of technology: 
They use online tools for nearly everything, which despite its 
opportunities, leads to a lack of face-to-face deliberation. These 
‘new processes’ could then well be a product of necessity, created 
when gaps in the processes, such as consensus-development, 
needed to be addressed.  
(12) Parties can be echo chambers, and as Weinberger [21] and 
Stevens and O’Hara [32] argue this need not be a negative effect. 
Reinforcing the dominant views among members could have a 
stabilizing effect on internal political discourse. However, this can 
only work if the members truly have similar views. When the Green 
Party wings formed, the internet was not around yet. The failure of 
the Pirate Party to establish institutionalised wings, which could 
negotiate positions, may point to a new development.  If online 
communication is indeed reinforcing dominant views, the echo 
chamber effect may also reinforce the differences between the 
views, thus decreasing the foundational agreement and 
destabilising the party. If this were the case, online communication 
would be a barrier to cooperation. If platforms themselves promote 
uniformity, controversial discussions may even be prevented by 
design, thus reducing the democracy in the process. 
(13) Party wings could fill the role that Agre [2] saw for parties in 
democracy at large within parties. But where groups are not 
institutionalised and thus cannot be represented, consensus can 
neither be sought nor found. In their absence, the groups in the 
Pirate Party compete in size, and whichever group happens to be 
larger at assemblies forces their goals onto the other, and decisions 
are made by conflict rather than by consensus. If this is indeed the 
case, then the proposed advantages of Liquid Democracy, rather 
than leading to a more inclusive and participatory environment, 
may in fact result in fragmentation. Potentially, Liquid Democracy 
as a way of decision-making is not compatible with the 
organisational structure of a political party at all, since the very 
advantages of Liquid Democracy (more expertise, overcoming time 
and space limitations for face-to-face meetings, knowledge gaps of 
voters [28]), are contrary to one of the main advantages of political 
parties: to synthesise opinions into coherent platforms [2]. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Processes required by law such as motion proposals by members, 
assemblies, or offline votes result in similarities among German 
parties. However, beyond that the two parties differ vastly, with 
very different effects on in- and exclusion. As we have shown, the 
internet does not by itself lead to more inclusion. To the contrary, 
new forms of exclusion can arise through differences in internet 
access, internet use, as well as the overwhelming amount of 
information made available through the web. Both cases we 
discussed are set in the specific context of the German political 
culture and political system. On the one hand, this context is very 
specific, so that conclusions beyond it should be drawn with care. 
On the other hand however, Germany is a Western democracy, and 
as such often the basis for democracy theory. In either case, the 
structure developed here may help to structure future work, which 
would need to see whether the differences found here are visible in 
a larger or differently composed sample.  
The internet on its own does not determine the culture of a party, 
but it appears to have a strong influence on their process design. In 
turn, the culture of the party influences its adoption of technology. 
To a degree, party structure and internet technology can be 
mutually supportive, but this requires careful consideration of the 
existing party structure and culture. Both new processes and tools 
need to be designed in a way that is compatible with the current 
situation within the party. The best solution for online participation 
will always be dependent on specific use-cases. The goals, 
especially the perception of democratic decisions, need to be 
considered in process and tool design, in addition to the target 
group. Potential barriers and causes for exclusion should be 
discussed in early stages of the process.  
Further work is needed to understand the effect of the internet on 
democratic decisions within parties better. For example, 
quantitative data could help to validate the satisfaction of members 
with the decisions made by assemblies, and the preferences and 
reasons for the acceptance of the different participation processes. 
Equally, the effects of specific internet technologies on in- and 
exclusion, such as the accessibility of the web over e.g. VoIP or 
other arbitrary layers, would warrant further investigation. A 
quantitative analysis of the overlap between the members that 
participate online, offline, and their demographic profile could give 
insight into the question whether different forms of participation 
can be predicted by demographics. 
The biggest challenge remains to find a workable connection 
between both online and offline forms of participation, to prevent 
siloed discussions, benefit from the advantages of both forms, and 
stimulate more and broader participation overall. 
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